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NOTES

Rethinking Jurisdictional Discovery
Evidence
Hague
the
Under
Convention
ABSTRACT

When a federal court in the United States compels the
discovery of information located abroad to determine whether it
has jurisdiction over the defendant, the court can apply the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Hague Evidence
Convention. This Note argues that the approach taken by most
courts-applying the balancing test formulated by the Supreme
Court in Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. U.S.
District Court and favoring application of the FederalRules-is
misguided. Courts should apply the Evidence Convention more
often in jurisdictionaldiscovery disputes. They can do so under
the existing legal framework with one of three holdings: (1) the
Adrospatiale test does not apply to jurisdictional discovery
disputes and parties must use the Evidence Convention; (2) the
Adrospatiale test does not apply and the Evidence Convention
should be used as a first resort, turning to the Federal Rules
only when the Convention's procedures prove infeasible; or (3)
the Adrospatiale test applies, but recognition that the court has
not established personaljurisdiction weighs so heavily in favor
of applying the Evidence Convention that it has a similar effect
as the first-resort approach. Each of these alternatives is
preferable to the current approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Justice Blackmun, in the U.S. Supreme Court decision Socidt6
Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale v. U.S. District Court
(Agrospatiale), explained that, "no aspect of the extension of the
American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United
States has given rise to so much friction as the request for documents
associated with investigation and litigation in the United States."'
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters (Evidence Convention), ratified by the United
States in 1972, reflects an effort on behalf of the signatory countries
to find common ground in light of significant differences in evidenceIn 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
gathering procedures.2
Adrospatiale, held that the Evidence Convention is an optional
procedure that can be used in lieu of the Federal Rules of Civil

1.
Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S.
522, 549 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442 reporters' note 1 (1987))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2.
Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions:
Concerns of Conformity and Comity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 903, 905 (1989).
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Procedure (Federal Rules).3 The Court granted lower courts the
discretion to employ the procedures of the Evidence Convention in a
case after examining "the particular facts, sovereign interests, and
4
likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove effective."
Subsequent lower court cases generally have placed the burden of
persuasion on the party requesting application of the Evidence
Convention.5 Furthermore, these courts usually conclude that the
6
party failed to meet that burden and apply the Federal Rules.
In Adrospatiale, the defendant did not contest personal
jurisdiction, and as a result, the Court did not address whether its
holding applies to jurisdictional discovery. A number of district
courts and one appellate court have addressed this issue, and most
have held that (1) the Adrospatiale balancing test applies equally to
jurisdictional discovery, and (2) the balancing test favors application
of the Federal Rules.7 The arguments in support of these positions
They do not fully consider the scope of the
are misguided.
Adrospatiale holding, do not adequately perform the comity analysis,
and ultimately do not give sufficient regard to the Evidence
Convention procedures. Courts can apply the Evidence Convention
more frequently under the existing legal framework with one of three
holdings: (1) the Adrospatiale test does not apply to jurisdictional
discovery disputes and parties must use the Evidence Convention; (2)

3.
A&ospatiale, 482 U.S. at 541.
4.
Id. at 544.
5.
Gary B. Born & Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: PostA6rospatiale Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 INT'L LAW. 393, 401
(1990).
6.
Patrick J. Borchers, The Incredible Shrinking Hague Evidence Convention,
38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 73, 84 (2003). A significant amount of scholarly debate surrounds the
prudence of the Adrospatiale decision and the manner in which lower courts have
applied it. See George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence Convention in the Supreme
Court: A Critique of the A6rospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 525 (1989); Stephen F.
Black, United States TransnationalDiscovery: The Rise and Fall of the Hague Evidence
Convention, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 901 (1991); James Chalmers, The Hague Evidence
Convention and Discovery Inter Parties:Trial Court Decisions Post-Abrospatiale, 8 TUL.
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 189 (2000); Weis, supra note 2; Patricia J. Youngblood & John J.
Welsh, Obtaining Evidence Abroad: A Model for Defining and Resolving the Choice of
Law Between the FederalRules of Civil Procedureand the Hague Evidence Convention,
10 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 1 (1988), http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jillarticles/
volumel0/issuel/Welshl0U.Pa.J.Int'lBus.L. 1(1988).pdf; Matthew B. Kutac, Note,
Reallocating the Burden of Persuasion Under the Aerospatiale Approach to
TransnationalDiscovery, 24 REV. LITIG. 173 (2005); Diana Lloyd Muse, Note, Discovery
in Franceand the Hague Convention: The Search for a French Connection, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1073 (1989); John C. Plaster, Note, The Hague Evidence Convention: The Need for
Guidance on Procedures and Resolution of Conflicts in Transnational Discovery, 27
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1994).
In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2004);
7.
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. 45 (D.D.C. 2000); Fishel v. BASF Grp.,
175 F.R.D. 525 (S.D. Iowa 1997); In re Bedford Computer Corp., 114 B.R. 2 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1990); Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
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the Adrospatiale test does not apply and the Evidence Convention
should be used as a first resort, turning to the Federal Rules only
when the Convention's procedures prove infeasible; or (3) the
Adrospatiale test applies, but recognition that the court has not
established personal jurisdiction weighs so heavily in favor of
applying the Evidence Convention that it has a similar effect as the
first-resort approach.
This Note begins by explaining some of the differences in civil
procedure in the United States and abroad; it then surveys the
contours of the Evidence Convention, the Adrospatiale decision and
its comity analysis, and lower court cases guided by that decisionfocusing on those addressing jurisdictional discovery disputes. Next,
it sets out the three alternative approaches, observing the benefits
and drawbacks to each one.8

II. BACKGROUND
A. Discovery and Jurisdictionin the United States
Under the Federal Rules, parties have wide latitude to
conduct pretrial discovery. A party can obtain information on "any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense."9 Further, "relevant information need not be admissible at
the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
Professor Stephen Yeazell
discovery of admissible evidence."' 0
observed that, "[1]awyers conduct discovery without any but the
slightest judicial supervision unless something goes wrong. So long
as things remain in this state, discovery has virtually disappeared
from the judicial arena.""
Before a court in the United States can assess the merits of a
case, it must establish both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
Parties can use discovery procedures to resolve factual disputes over

8.
This Note analyzes jurisdictional discovery between countries that are
contracting parties to the Evidence Convention. Members of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law can choose either ratification, accession, continuation,
succession, or denunciation. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter
Hague Evidence Convention]. Similar issues arise when one or both of the countries
are not contracting parties, but this is beyond the scope of the Note.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
9.
10.
Id.
Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil
11.
Process, 1994 WIs. L. REV. 631, 651 (1994).
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a court's jurisdiction.1 2 Trial judges maintain significant discretion to
grant or deny jurisdictional discovery. 13 As a consequence, courts
have construed the standard for granting jurisdictional discovery in
slightly different terms. The Third Circuit, in Metcalfe v. Renaissance
Marine, Inc., explained that, "if 'the plaintiffs claim is not clearly
frivolous [as to the basis for personal jurisdiction], the district court
should ordinarily allow discovery on jurisdiction in order to aid the
plaintiff in discharging that burden."' 14 The Eighth Circuit remanded
a case for jurisdictional discovery even though it found that the
plaintiff had not made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.' 5 Although not all courts agree that a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction is an absolute prerequisite for
permitting jurisdictional discovery, "[w]hen a plaintiff offers only
speculation or conclusory assertions about contacts with a forum
state, a court is within its discretion in denying jurisdictional
discovery."1 6 Courts have also considered whether the defendant has
control of the jurisdictional facts, whether the defendant has provided
evidence rebutting the assertion of jurisdiction, and other equitable
factors.' 7
In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De
8
Guinee, petitioners, fourteen foreign insurance companies,' filed a
motion for summary judgment in the district court alleging that the
After several
court lacked personal jurisdiction over them.' 9
unsuccessful attempts to obtain documents located abroad, the
respondent filed a motion to compel production and the district court
gave petitioners sixty days to produce the information. 20 When
petitioners failed to produce the information, the district court held
that it had personal jurisdiction over petitioners. 2 ' The court invoked
Federal Rule 37(b)(2)(A), which states that "[i]f a party . . . fails to
obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the court . . . may

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978)
12.
("[W]here issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to ascertain the
facts bearing on such issues.").
13.

GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN

UNITED STATES COURTS 992 (4th ed. 2007).
Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 336 (3d Cir. 2009)
14.
(quoting Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee v. L'Union Atlantique S.A. D'Assurances,
723 F.2d. 357, 362 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 589 (8th Cir. 2008).
15.
Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402
16.
(4th Cir. 2003).
17.

18.
696 (1982).
19.
20.
21.

BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 13, at 992-93.

Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
Id. at 698.
Id. at 699.
Id.
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issue further just orders." 22 The Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's jurisdictional holding 23 and the Supreme Court affirmed the
Third Circuit's decision. 24
The Court observed that petitioners failed to recognize the
distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction. 2 5 It noted that subject matter jurisdiction is both a
constitutional requirement, flowing from Article III, and a statutory
requirement. 26 According to the Court, it "functions as a restriction
on federal power, and contributes to the characterization of the
federal sovereign." 27 "[No action of the parties can confer subjectmatter jurisdiction upon a federal court." 28 Thus, the principles of
estoppel and waiver do not apply.29 In contrast, the Court explained
that personal jurisdiction derives from the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment rather than Article II.30
Therefore, "[i]t
represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." 3 ' The Court then
cited InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, stating that the test for
personal jurisdiction "requires that the maintenance of the suit not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 32
Ultimately, personal jurisdiction is "a legal right protecting the
individual."3 3 Therefore, a party can waive a claim that personal
jurisdiction is lacking and a defendant can be estopped from raising
the issue. 34 The Court observed that "[t]he expression of legal rights
is often subject to certain procedural rules: The failure to follow those
rules may well result in a curtailment of the rights."35 Insurance
Corp. of Ireland is cited for the proposition that a trial court has
jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction, 36 or more specifically, that a
court can compel jurisdictional discovery abroad to determine
whether it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.3 7 As will be
discussed later, the concern over individual liberty driving the
personal jurisdiction standard does not justify allowing courts to

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)).
Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 456 U.S. at 700.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 456 U.S. at 702.
Id. at 703 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 704.
Id.
Id. at 705.
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2000).
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 13, at 992.
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conduct discovery to determine whether there is personal jurisdiction
by any means they choose, because the method of discovery
implicates similar concerns driving the subject matter jurisdiction
requirement, namely, sovereignty.38

B. Evidence Gathering Outside of the United States
In stark contrast to the American discovery process, in civil law
countries the court conducts evidence gathering, rather than the
parties.3 9 The purpose of judicial control is to safeguard individuals
from undue coercion and ensure that privileges are respected. 40
Further, it is rooted in the desire to protect litigants from the
invasion of privacy that was prevalent in the fascist and communist
governments of Europe during World War II.41
In civil law systems, the parties can typically only obtain
material that is admissible at trial. 4 2 Most importantly, in civil law
countries litigation is not bifurcated between pretrial procedures and
Instead, once a suit has been filed all the
the trial itself.4 3
considered
part of the trial. 44 As a result, "civil law
proceedings are
systems . . . interpret United States discovery efforts as private trials.

Furthermore, these attempts at discovery [are] viewed as being
hostile to judicial sovereignty, because the taking of evidence in civil
law countries is essentially a sovereign function." 45 Foreign countries
often equate the American discovery process to an unrestrained
fishing expedition. 46 There are even differences between discovery in
the United States and other common law countries. In the United
Kingdom, the scope of disclosure broadened with the enactment of the
Civil Procedure Rules 31 and 34 in 1998.47 Nevertheless, the court
may order disclosure from a nonparty only when the documents are
likely to support the case of the applicant or adversely affect another
party and "disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the

38.
See infra Part III.A.
Youngblood & Welsh, supra note 6, at 7.
39.
40.
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 13, at 911.
41.
Jerry F. Barbanel & Daryk Rowland, Navigating the Complexities of U.S.E.U. Data Protection and Electronic Discovery Issues, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Dec.
2007, at 23, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/December/23.pdf.
42.
Youngblood & Welsh, supranote 6, at 7.
43.
Id. at 8.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism"and ComparativeProcedure, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 294 (2002).
47.
Marat A. Massen, Note, Discovery for Foreign Proceedings After Intel v.
Advanced Micro Devices: A CriticalAnalysis of 28 U.S.C. §1782 Jurisprudence,83 S.
CAL. L. REV. 875, 890 (2010).
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claim or to save costs."4 8 Additionally, the general rule on costs is
that the loser pays for the costs of both parties, and this includes the
costs of disclosure of documents. 4 9
Some nations instituted blocking statutes to prevent U.S. parties
These
from conducting unilateral, extraterritorial discovery.50
statutes forbid individuals from disclosing information located in that
country for discovery in a U.S. proceeding. 5 ' For instance, the French
blocking statute prohibits any disclosure unless the party seeking the
information uses the procedures of the Evidence Convention. 52
Historically, U.S. courts have not considered the French blocking
statute to be a sufficient reason to compel parties to use the Evidence
Convention, noting that it amounts to an empty threat.5 3 Courts may
have to reevaluate this stance, as France's Cour de cassation
(Supreme Court) recently upheld a fine against a French lawyer who
violated the blocking statute.5 4 In contrast, some blocking statues do
not bar foreign discovery across the board; instead, they grant an
official the authority to forbid compliance with specific requests. 5 5
The United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act authorizes
the British Secretary of State to prohibit discovery of information in
the United Kingdom for the purposes of foreign litigation when
discovery would infringe on national sovereignty or security. 56
Australia and Canada have implemented similar laws.57 Other
statutes prohibit the disclosure of information regarding a particular
industry, such as the 1979 Banking Statute of Australia, the
Uranium Information Security Regulations of Canada, and the
United Kingdom Shipping Contracts and Commercial Disputes Act.5 8

48.
SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GRP. ON INT'L ELEC. INFO. MGMT.,
DISCOVERY & DISCLOSURE, INTERNATIONAL OVERVIEW OF DISCOVERY, DATA PRIVACY &
DISCLOSURE 184 (2009).
Id. at 185 (noting that the court may also make a different order regarding
49.
costs).
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 13, at 914.
50.
51.
Id.
Stephen R. Reynolds, Management of International Litigation, 826
52.
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES: LITIGATION 409, 412 (2010).
53.
Id. at 412-13; see, e.g., In re Global Power Equip. Grp., Inc., 418 B.R. 833,
849-50 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (noting that the "chance of prosecution under the French
Blocking Statute is minimal" and that "France and the United States each ratified the
Hague Evidence Convention over thirty-five years ago").
54.
Id.
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 13, at 914.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
58.
Id. at 915.
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C. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters
In 1968, the United States initiated negotiations at a meeting of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law that ultimately
led to the creation of the Hague Evidence Convention.s9 The goal of
the Evidence Convention was "to reconcile different, often conflicting,
discovery procedures in civil and common law countries."6 0 It took
effect in 1972, and there are forty-seven contracting states, including
France, the United Kingdom, China, India, and Switzerland. 6 1 Under
the Evidence Convention, evidence located abroad can be obtained
through letters of request or through diplomatic officers, consular
agents, or commissioners. 62 A judicial authority of one country may
send a letter of request to the "central authority" of another country
to obtain evidence or "to perform some other judicial act."63 The
Evidence Convention provides that a letter of request shall be
executed expeditiously. 64 Furthermore, the authority in the country
receiving the letter applies that country's law as to the methods and
procedures followed in obtaining the evidence. 65 However, a country
is compelled to follow a request for a special procedure, "unless this is
incompatible with the internal law of the State of execution or is

59.
Youngblood & Welsh, supra note 6, at 9.
60.
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 8; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1782 (West 2010)
(empowering each district court to order persons in its jurisdiction to give testimony or
produce documents for use in proceedings in foreign or international tribunals, in
accordance with the Hague Evidence Convention). James Chalmers explained, "one
might wonder whether the Hague Convention was intended for use in U.S.-style
discovery proceedings at all." Chalmers, supra note 6, at 192. The Evidence
Convention, by its terms, deals solely with "evidence-gathering" and for the most part
does not address discovery. Id. at 191-92. Whether or not the drafters intended the
Evidence Convention to cover discovery depends in part on how the phrase "judicial
proceedings" is interpreted and whether discovery conducted after the suit is filed but
before trial is considered a judicial proceeding. Id. at 193. But this question is beyond
the scope of the Note and courts presume, without question, that the Evidence
Convention covers U.S.-style discovery proceedings. See, e.g., Soci~t6 Nationale
Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) ("The
question presented in this case concerns the extent to which a federal district court
must employ the procedures set forth in the Convention when litigants seek answers to
interrogatories, the production of documents, and admissions from a French adversary
over whom the court has personal jurisdiction.").
61.
Hague Evidence Convention-Acceptances of Accessions, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, http://www.hcch.net/upload/overview20e.pdf (last
updated Jan. 5, 2011).
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 8, arts. 1-22.
62.
Id. arts. 1-2. "The function of the central authority is to receive the letters
63,
of request from foreign authorities and to transmit them to the appropriate tribunals
within the executing state. This process is intended to eliminate uncertainty as to the
proper recipient of letters of request." Youngblood & Welsh, supranote 6, at 11.
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 8, art. 9.
64.
65.
Id.
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impossible of performance by reason of its internal practice and
procedure or by reason of practical difficulties." 66
There are several factors limiting the scope and effectiveness of
these letters of request. First, "[in the execution of a Letter of
Request the person concerned may refuse to give evidence in so far as
he has a privilege or duty to refuse to give the evidence under the law
of the State of execution." 6 7 Additionally, Article 12(b) permits a
contracting state to refuse to execute a letter of request when the
state "considers that its sovereignty or security would be
prejudiced[.]" 68 Finally, Article 23 states that, "[a] Contracting State
may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it
will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining
pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law
countries." 69 With the exception of the United States, the Czech
Republic, Israel, and the Slovak Republic, all of the parties to the
Convention have some form of reservation under Article 23.70 Some
countries instituted Article 23 reservations because they incorrectly
believe that "pre-trial" discovery is discovery conducted before a suit
has been filed.71 The Hague Conference on Private International Law
acknowledged that Article 23 is a "continued source of
misunderstandings."7 2 Attendees at the conference observed that
Article 23 was originally intended to ensure that requests for
documents are sufficiently substantiated and that one party does not
utilize the procedure merely to find out what documents the other
party possesses.7 3 The Conference recommended that countries with
general Article 23 declarations revisit them to conform to the original
Nevertheless, most countries have
meaning of that Article.74

Id.
66.
Id. art. 11.
67.
Id. art. 12.
68.
Id. art. 23.
69.
70.
Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.govllaw/judicial/judicial 689.html (last
visited Jan. 10, 2011).
Gary A. Adler et al., Electronic Discovery Guidance 2008: What Corporate
71.
and Outside Counsel Need to Know, 783 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: LITIGATION 289, 294 (2008).

Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Oct. 4-Nov. 4, 2003, Conclusions
72.
and Recommendations of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the
Hague Apostille, Evidence and Service Conventions, $ 29, http://hceh.e-vision.nl/
upload/wop/lseconcl-e.pdf.
73.

Id.

74.

Id.

34.
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maintained these reservations, and they reduce the effectiveness of
the Evidence Convention for discovery in the United States.75
Under Chapter II of the Evidence Convention, "a diplomatic
officer or consular agent of a Contracting State may, in the territory
of another Contracting State and within the area where he exercises
his functions, take the evidence . . . in aid of proceedings commenced

However, a
in the courts of a State which he represents." 76
contracting state can stipulate that a diplomatic officer can take
evidence only if the state receiving the request gives the officer
permission to do so. 77 Additionally, an individual who has evidence
that an officer wishes to obtain can refuse to turn it over if the laws of
that country prohibit disclosure. 7 8
In 2003, a Special Commission reviewed the Evidence
Convention.7 9 It found that litigators in the United States prefer the
Federal Rules to the Evidence Convention, primarily because of the
amount of time discovery can take under the Evidence Convention.80
Further, American lawyers expressed concern over their ability to
identify desired documents with an adequate degree of specificity. 8 1
Indicating that timeliness is still a concern when conducting
discovery under the Convention, the 2009 Special Commission
"encourage[d] State Parties to take measures to improve the effective
operation of the Convention." 82 Moreover, the Commission suggested
that state parties consider accepting letters of request in electronic
form. 83 It also reiterated the 2003 Commission's observation that
the mandatory or
states have different views regarding
nonmandatory character of the Convention. 84

75.

See

LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL

LITIGATION

184-85

(1996)

(describing the problems created where "an executing country claims broader privileges
than the requesting country").
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 8, art. 15.
76.
77.

Id.

78.
Id. art. 21(e).
Erica M. Davila, InternationalE-Discovery: Navigating the Maze, 8 U. PITT.
79.
J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 5, T 36 (2008). The Special Commission met to review the
operations of the Hague Apostille, Evidence, and Service Conventions. The Commission
included 116 delegates from 57 member states. After meeting, the Commission
published conclusions and recommendations for the three conventions. Hague
Conference on Private Int'l Law, supra note 72, 1.
Davila, supranote 79, at 1 36.
80.
Id.
81.
Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Feb. 2-12, 2009, Conclusions and
82.
Recommendations of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague
Apostille, Service, Taking of Evidence and Access to Justice Conventions, T 43.
Id. 1 49.
83.
84.
Id. 1 53.
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D. The A6rospatiale Decision
In 1987, the Supreme Court, in Adrospatiale, addressed a federal
district court's obligation to employ the Evidence Convention
procedures "when litigants seek answers to interrogatories, the
production of documents, and admissions from a French adversary
over whom the court has personal jurisdiction."8 5 The Court held
that the text and history of the Evidence Convention demonstrate
that it was intended to be an optional procedure to facilitate the
taking of evidence abroad.86 It further rejected petitioners' argument
that courts should first look to the Evidence Convention when a party
requests discovery of information located abroad.8 7 The Court noted
that the opposite conclusion would create several unacceptable
First, requiring first resort to the Evidence
asymmetries.88
Convention allows the foreign party to obtain information pursuant to
the Federal Rules while the domestic party must use the
Convention." Second, a first-resort rule gives an unfair advantage to
foreign companies because they would be subject to "less extensive
discovery procedures" even though they decided to market their
products in the United States.9 0 Third, because the Evidence
Convention applies only to parties from contracting states and not to
parties that are nationals of other, non-contracting states, "the [firstresort] rule would confer an unwarranted advantage on some
domestic litigants over others similarly situated."9 '
The Court explained that the concept of international comity
should serve as a guide for lower courts when deciding which
procedure to employ. 92 Furthermore, the Court noted that the nature
of the concerns that guide the comity analysis are contained in the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 436(1)(c). These factors include,

Soci~td Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S.
85.
522, 524-25 (1987) ("Petitioners answered the complaints, apparently without
questioning the jurisdiction of the District Court.").
Id. at 538.
86.
Id. at 542.
87.
88.
Id. at 539-40 n.25.
Id.
89.
Id. The Court proceeded to explain, "A general rule according foreign
90.
nationals a preferred position in pretrial proceedings in our courts would conflict with
the principle of equal opportunity that governs the market they elected to enter." Id.
Id.
91.
92.
Id. at 543. Comity is defined as "[clourtesy among political entities (as
nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of
legislative, executive, and judicial acts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 110 (2d pocket ed.
2001).
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(1) the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other
information requested; (2) the degree of specificity of the request; (3)
whether the information originated in the United States; (4) the
availability of alternative means of securing the information; and (5)
the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with the
request would undermine important interests of the state where the
93
information is located.

Using the Restatement as a guide, the Court established a three-part
test, instructing lower courts to scrutinize the particular facts in each
case, the sovereign interests involved, and the likelihood that resort
to Evidence Convention procedures will prove effective. 94 Ultimately,
the Court's balancing test gives considerable discretion to lower
courts to determine whether to compel the parties to use the Evidence
Convention.95
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall,
and Justice O'Connor, concurred in part and dissented in part. He
warned

that

"[e]xperience

indicates . . . a

large

risk

that

the

[majority's] case-by-case comity analysis . .. will be performed
inadequately and that the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the
Convention will be invoked infrequently." 96 Instead of giving lower
courts this broad discretion, Justice Blackmun suggested that courts
apply a general presumption of first resort to the Convention
Further, when it appears futile to employ the
procedures. 9 7
Convention or when its procedures are unhelpful, courts should
analyze the particular circumstances of the case. 98 According to
Justice Blackmun, the Convention can serve the long-term interests
of the United States by "helping to further and to maintain the
climate of cooperation and goodwill necessary to the functioning of
the international legal and commercial systems."9 9

Id. at 544 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
93.
OF THE UNITED STATES § 437(1)(c) (1987)).

94.
Id. at 544. The Court merely required that the Evidence Convention "prove
effective." One court explained, "The question is whether proceeding with jurisdictional
discovery under Hague would allow these plaintiffs to obtain the necessary testimony,
documents, and written answers . . . in a timely and effective manner." In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2000). Another court found that the
comparative effectiveness of the Evidence Convention to the Federal Rules was
relevant. Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 258 (M.D.N.C. 1988) ("The final factor
to take into account is whether use of the Convention procedures would be effective.
Here, neither side has indicated that those procedures would not be effective. However,
defendants also do not show they will be more effective than use of the Federal Rules."
(internal citation omitted)).
95.
Borchers,
supra note
6,
at
81
("One
unfortunate
aspect
of .. . Mrospatiale. . . is that (it] effectively delegatets] to lower courts, with very little
guidance, the interpretation of the Hague Convention.").
96.
Adrospatiale,482 U.S. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97.
Id. at 548-49.
98.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 550.
99.
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E. Lower Courts'Applicationof Arospatiale
As Justice Blackmun predicted,10 0 a majority of lower courts
applying the Adrospatiale balancing test have determined that the
appropriate procedural device is the Federal Rules rather than the
Evidence Convention. 1 0 ' In addition to the considerations set forth
by the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, courts have analyzed
the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom
discovery is sought, the good faith of the party resisting discovery, 102
the extent to which the required conduct will take place outside the
United States, and the nationality of the entity involved. 03 Courts
generally place the burden of persuasion on the party seeking to
invoke the Evidence Convention.1 04 Professor Patrick Borchers noted
that, "[b]usy trial courts, anxious to have the litigants meet discovery
cut-offs and other case-management deadlines, are understandably
drawn to the familiar, and often faster, local procedures." 0 5
F. Comity
The Court in Arospatiale explained that the concept of
international comity should guide courts in determining which
procedures to use. 10 6 The Court elaborated that a consideration of
comity requires a particularized analysis of the interests of the
foreign nation and the requesting nation. 10 7 Further, it stated that
comity "refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal

100.
Id. at 548.
101.
Borchers, supra note 6, at 82 ("Although I cannot warrant that I have found
every case decided in the wake of Adrospatiale, the heavy preponderance of them
simply authorizes discovery under local procedures with only a passing nod to the
Evidence Convention."). But see Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, No. 02-Civ. 666
(JSR)(FM), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1215, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2003) ("In these
circumstances, it is appropriate that the plaintiffs be required to secure the additional
documents through the Hague Convention . . . . While the delay resulting from this
procedure may be extensive, the plaintiffs have not shown an adequate basis for the
Court to require otherwise."); In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 356
(D. Conn. 1991) (ordering the parties to use the Evidence Convention).
102.
In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02CIV5571RJHHBP, 2006 WL
3378115, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370,
375 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D. 429, 439 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 2008);
103.
Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Chalmers, supra note 6, at 199. But see Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH
104.
& Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) ('"This court believes that the burden should
be placed on the party opposing the use of Convention procedures to demonstrate that
those procedures would frustrate these interests.").
Borchers, supranote 6, at 74.
105.
Adrospatiale,482 U.S. at 543-44.
106.
107.
Id. at 543-44.
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approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of
other sovereign states." 08 The Court then cited and quoted from
Emory v. Grenough from 1797 and Hilton v. Guyot from 1895.109 This
constituted the full extent of the Court's discussion of comity in
Adrospatiale and, generally, lower courts do not flesh out the concept
more extensively.110 The concept of comity is widely debated, and
some scholars maintain that the confusion it creates outweighs its
utility."' To fully unpack this debate is beyond the scope of this
Note, but a brief explanation can guide the present analysis.
Comity has been described as "a recognition which one nation
extends within its own territory to the legislative, executive, or
judicial acts of another."" 2 In Somportex v. Philadelphia Chewing
Gum Co., the Third Circuit explained that comity is more than a
matter of courtesy, but it does not rise to an obligation or an
imperative.11 3 Nevertheless, the court stated that it should not be
withheld unless "its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to
1
the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect." 14
A number of judges and scholars have developed the concept of
judicial comity. Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Hartford Fire
Insurance v. California, stated that "comity of courts" occurs when
"judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more
appropriately adjudged elsewhere."ni" He contrasted judicial comity
with prescriptive comity, where nations demonstrate respect for one
another by limiting the reach of their laws.1 16 Professor Anne-Marie
Slaughter explained that the comity of courts is used to determine
where a case should be heard, what procedures to use, and what
discovery methods to employ.' 17 It is "the lubricant of transjudicial

108.
Id. at 544 n.27.
109.
Id.
110.
See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D. 429, 447 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895)); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A.
Sec. Litig., No. 02CIV5571RJHHBP, 2006 WL 3378115, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006)
(mentioning the factors that a court should consider in deciding whether to use the
Federal Rules or Evidence Convention, but not explaining the concept of comity more
generally); In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, 172 F.R.D. 295 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(failing to mention comity).
Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models of
111.
International Judicial Comity: Two Illustrations Using TransnationalDiscovery and
Breard Scenarios, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 591, 593 (2001) ("[T]he prevalent confusion over
[the] scope [of comity] has led some scholars to regard comity as either dead or
moribund, and to pen eloquent and poetic eulogies to either celebrate or hasten its
demise.").
Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
112.
1971).
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993).
115.
116.
Id.
117.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 708 (1998).
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relations."" 8 Then-Judge Breyer stated that judges must determine
how to "help the world's legal systems work together, in harmony,
rather than at cross purposes."11 9 One theory of judicial comity is
respect for foreign courts and their ability to resolve questions of fact
and law competently.120 Another recognizes that courts in different
countries are entitled to their share of disputes, "both as coequals in
the global task of judging and as the instruments of a strong 'local
interest having localized controversies decided at home."121
Professor Slaughter further noted that respect for foreign courts does
not necessarily mean deference. Rather, it requires awareness of the
interests of foreign courts and an effort to cooperate to resolve the
dispute. 122
G. JurisdictionalDiscovery Under the Hague Evidence Convention
The Supreme Court has not determined the applicability of its
Adrospatialedecision to jurisdictional discovery, as opposed to "merits
discovery." 123 Several lower courts have addressed this issue and a
substantial majority of them hold that (1) trial judges maintain the
broad discretion provided in Adrospatiale, and (2) the Adrospatiale
balancing test dictates that the Federal Rules, rather than the
Evidence Convention, should be applied.124 In Rich v. KIS California,
an early district court case addressing this question, the defendants
argued that until personal jurisdiction is established, discovery

118.
Id.
119.
Id. at 708-09 (quoting Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 950 (1st
Cir. 1991)).
120.
Slaughter, supra note 117, at 709.
121.
Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947)).
122.
Slaughter, supra note 117, at 710.
123.
"Merits discovery" is "[d]iscovery to uncover facts that support the claim or
defense, or that might lead to other facts that will support the allegations of a legal
proceeding." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532 (9th ed. 2009). In contrast, "jurisdictional
discovery" is 'limited to finding facts relevant to whether the court has jurisdiction." Id.
Additionally, "[a] court may allow limited jurisdictional discovery before it rules on a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction." Id.
124.
In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 302-05 (3d Cir.
2004); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. 45, 49, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2000);
Fishel v. BASF Grp., 175 F.R.D. 525, 529 (S.D. Iowa 1997); In re Bedford Computer
Corp., 114 B.R. 2, 5-6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990); Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254,
259-60 (M.D.N.C. 1988). But see Jenco v. Martech Int'l, Inc., No. 86-4229, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4727, at *1 (E.D. La. May 20, 1988) (applying the Adrospatiale balancing
test, but finding in favor of the Hague Convention); Geo-Culture, Inc. v. Siam Inv.
Mgmt., 147 Ore. App. 536, 544 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the trial court's
application of the Evidence Convention to conduct jurisdictional discovery); Knight v.
Ford Motor Co., 260 N.J. Super. 110, 119-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (finding
that the Evidence Convention is the only procedure to use when conducting
jurisdictional discovery).
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should proceed through the Evidence Convention, as if the defendants
were a nonparty. In the alternative, they argued that the Evidence
Convention should be used first before resorting to the Federal
Rules.125 The court rejected both of these arguments and explained
that
[tihe fact [that] defendant is a foreign litigant does not require
deviation from the principle that discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure may be employed to establish personal jurisdiction over
it. The limitations espoused in the concept of personal jurisdiction do
not find their basis in Article III of the Constitution. Rather, they stem
126
from the due process clause.

The Evidence Convention was not entitled to preference, and the
court proceeded with an analysis of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. 127 It first noted that the discovery request was
not intrusive because it consisted of ten interrogatories.' 2 8
Additionally, the court observed that the Federal Rules were
considered more efficient, which was important in light of plaintiffs'
need to establish personal jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits
of the case.129 The court also found that using the Federal Rules did
not "impinge on an important sovereign interest of the French
nation."' 30 Finally, it mentioned that although the proponents of the
Federal Rules did not demonstrate that Evidence Convention
procedures to be ineffective, the defendants did not show these
3
procedures to be more effective than the Federal Rules.' '
For the individual defendant, the court found that the discovery
requests amounted to a fishing expedition and did not permit
discovery.' 3 2 However, the court permitted discovery pursuant to the
Federal Rules for the corporate defendant. 33 The court highlighted
that "[i]t may be tempting to prefer use of Convention procedures
Such
until questions of personal jurisdiction are established.
by
the
is
counterbalanced
solicitation towards foreign sensibilities
of
the
resolution
thorough
greater need to obtain prompt and
of
merit
matters
so
that
issues
normally non-sensitive preliminary
may be reached."1 34
In a subsequent federal bankruptcy case, the court followed the
reasoning of Rich v. KIS Californiaand held that

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 257.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 259-60.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 259-60.
Id. at 260.
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[Plaintiff] only seeks discovery of personal jurisdiction matters and
there has been no showing of any prejudice to any sovereign interests.
Indeed, the only effect of using the Hague [Evidence] Convention rules
would be to further delay this adversary proceeding. The solution is to
35
limit the discovery sought, and still use the F.R.C.P.1

In Fishel v. BASF Group, the District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa proceeded with a similar analysis, concluding that
the court should conduct jurisdictional discovery through the Federal
Rules rather than the Evidence Convention.136 Explaining first that
the court has jurisdiction to establish its jurisdiction, the court then
held that the Adrospatiale decision did not support defendants'
argument that until personal jurisdiction has been established, the
court is limited to using the Evidence Convention to proceed with
discovery.13 7 It engaged in the comity analysis and again required
the parties to apply the Federal Rules.s3 8
In In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, the District Court for the
District of Columbia concluded that Adrospatiale did not resolve the
question of what procedures should be used in cases of jurisdictional
discovery.' 3 9 The court held that because it had "jurisdiction over
necessary
to
extent
to
the
defendants
the[]
foreign
determine . . . personal jurisdiction," there was "no legal barrier to
exercising the discretion given to trial courts by Adrospatialein cases
of jurisdictional discovery." 140 The court further noted that applying
the Adrospatiale balancing test to jurisdictional discovery would not
offend the sovereign interests of the countries affected anymore so
than applying the balancing test to merits discovery. 141 The court
listed three considerations in support of its conclusion. First, the
court stated that investigating an antitrust price-fixing conspiracy
did not offend the sovereign interests of other nations because this
conduct is prohibited by many of these nations. 142 Second, although
the plaintiffs' allegation of personal jurisdiction was not conclusive,
the court determined that it was more than a mere fishing
expedition.1 43 Finally, the court observed that the discovery requests
After
were narrowly tailored to jurisdictional questions. 144

In re Bedford Computer Corp., 114 B.R. 2, 6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990).
135.
Fishel v. BASF Grp., 175 F.R.D. 525, 529 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
139.
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2000)
("Therefore, it is clear that the Supreme Court in Aerospatiale never addressed the
issue of what procedures to follow in cases of jurisdictional discovery; that issue was
never before the Court and certainly was not resolved by the holding of Aerospatiale.").
140.
Id.
141.
Id. at 50.
Id.
142.
143.
Id.
144.
Id. at 51.
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conducting the Adrospatiale analysis, the court compelled discovery to
proceed through the Federal Rules rather than the Evidence
Convention. 4 5
The Third Circuit is the only circuit court that has addressed the
applicability of the Hague Convention to transnational jurisdictional
discovery. In In re Automotive Refinishing PaintAntitrust Litigation,
the court followed the lead of most lower court decisions and declined
to adopt a first-resort rule favoring the Evidence Convention
procedures.1 46 Furthermore, the court explained that the distinction
between merits and jurisdictional discovery in this context is a false
dichotomy; the presence of personal jurisdiction in Adrospatiale was
tangential to its holding.147 Therefore, the court found that the
8
Adrospatiale holding applies equally to jurisdictional discovery.' 4
The court further noted that the plaintiffs alleged a prima facie case
of personal jurisdiction and the appellants voluntarily appeared in
court to challenge jurisdiction.14 9
The court provided several other reasons why Adrospatiale
applies equally to jurisdictional discovery. First, the court explained
that merits discovery is generally "more comprehensive or
burdensome than jurisdictional discovery." 50 Accordingly, "there is
more justification to reject a first resort rule for the more limited and
less intrusive jurisdictional discovery." 15 '
Second, Adrospatiale rejected a first-resort rule even though the
French defendants faced possible sanctions under the blocking
statute.152 In contrast, the German defendants in Auto Refinishing
did not face any comparable sanction.1 53 Finally, "where Arospatiale
has rejected the adoption of a blanket first resort rule based on the
proffered reasons of respecting the 'judicial sovereignty' of the
signatory host nation and preventing discovery abuse, the same
54
After
reasons proffered by the appellants here must fail as well."1
applying the balancing test to defendants, the court found that they
failed to satisfy the burden of persuasion and applied the Federal
55
Rules rather than the Evidence Convention procedures.
Judge Roth, in her concurrence, expressed concern that the
Evidence Convention had been given "short shrift" since the

145.
146.
2004).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 54.
In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 302 (3d Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 303.
at 302-03.
at 303.

at 304.
at 305.
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Adrospatiale decision. 156 She explained that although the Convention
is an optional procedure, it was also not intended to be inferior to the
Federal Rules.1 57 Judge Roth suggested that the Supreme Court
revisit the decision because many courts have not exercised the
"special vigilance to protect foreign litigants" as the Supreme Court
instructed in Adrospatiale.158
There are several exceptions to the general trend of applying the
Federal Rules (or the equivalent state procedural rules) to
transnational jurisdictional discovery disputes. The Court of Appeals
of Oregon upheld a trial court's order directing jurisdictional
discovery to be conducted using the Evidence Convention because the
plaintiffs complaint failed to allege a prima facie basis for asserting
personal jurisdiction. 59 In Jenco v. Martech International, the
District Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana stated that first
resort to the Evidence Convention is not required and courts should
conduct a balancing test.160 Nevertheless, it held that although the
Federal Rules may promote judicial economy, "the interests of
protecting a foreign litigant in light of the jurisdictional problems are
paramount."'61 The court found no reason to depart from the
Evidence Convention procedures until jurisdiction was established. 162
The Superior Court of New Jersey, in Robert v. Knight, took a more
forceful approach when it stated in a footnote that
[ilf jurisdiction does not exist over a foreign party, obviously there can
be no merits discovery under the rules of a court that lacks jurisdiction,
and the Convention may provide the only recourse for obtaining
evidence. Only when jurisdiction is found does the analysis even begin
163
as to whether the Convention should be invoked.

156.
Id. at 306.
157.
Id. ("However the Hague Convention is only as 'optional' as deciding to use
the Federal Rules is 'optional' in such a case. The Convention does not overwrite the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but it is in no way inferior to them.").
158.
Id.
159.
Geo-Culture, Inc. v. Siam Inv. Mgmt., 147 Ore. App. 536, 544 (Or. Ct. App.
1997).
160.
Jenco v. Martech Int'l, Inc., No. 86-4229, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4727, at
*1-2 (E.D. La. May 20, 1988).
161.
Id. at *2.
Id.
162.
163.
Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 260 N.J. Super. 110, 119 n.11 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1992); see also Husa v. Laboratoires Servier SA, 326 N.J. Super. 150, 155-56
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
[W]e perceive no conflict with federal supremacy, if, in exercising the option to
resort to the Convention, we are more generous in our use of the Convention's
procedures than the United States' courts. . . . We are persuaded that the
Convention should be utilized unless it is demonstrated that its use will
substantially impair the search for truth ... or will cause unduly prejudicial
delay.
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In sum, courts applying the Evidence Convention offer various
grounds of support for their decision but do not provide extensive
justifications for their outcomes.

III. PROPOSALS
As discussed above, the current trend among courts when faced
with a jurisdictional discovery dispute over information located
abroad is (1) to apply the Adrospatiale balancing test, and (2) as a
result, require the parties to employ the Federal Rules rather than
the Evidence Convention. Both of these steps are misguided. Courts
have three alternatives: (1) reject the A6rospatiale test and apply the
Evidence Convention, as in the case of discovery from nonparty
foreign individuals;1 64 (2) reject the Adrospatiale test and adopt a rule
of first resort to the Evidence Convention, turning to the Federal
Rules only when the Convention's procedures prove infeasible; or (3)
apply the Adrospatiale test, but recognition that the court has not
established personal jurisdiction weighs so heavily in favor of the
Evidence Convention that it has a similar effect as the first-resort
approach.165
A. The Evidence Convention as the Exclusive Means for
a Party to Obtain JurisdictionalDiscovery Abroad
In order to assert that the Evidence Convention is the only
means to obtain jurisdictional discovery abroad, it is necessary to
explain why courts do not have authority to order discovery abroad
pursuant to the Federal Rules before personal jurisdiction has been
established. To do so, a court can argue that its authority to
determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over a party does not
also include authority to require discovery to be conducted by any
means it chooses, because discovery abroad pursuant to the Federal
Rules before a U.S. court has established personal jurisdiction over a
party violates the sovereignty of that nation.
A court must call into question other courts' assertion that they
can apply the Adrospatiale balancing test (and consequently require

Husa, 326 N.J. Super. at 155-56.
Cf. Rich v. KIS Cal. Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 258 (M.D.N.C. 1988) ("Compulsory
164.
discovery of non-party foreigners may only be accomplished through use of the Hague
Evidence Convention.").
In the one piece found analyzing application of the Hague Convention to
165.
transnational jurisdictional discovery, Jenia Iontcheva argued, "The extension of
Adrospatiale to jurisdictional discovery is plagued with inconsistency underlying all
orders for discovery at the pre-jurisdiction stage." Jenia Iontcheva, Case Note,
Sovereignty on Our Terms, 110 YALE L.J. 885, 888 (2001).
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the parties to proceed using the Federal Rules) to jurisdictional
discovery because the court has jurisdiction over the foreign entity to
determine whether there is personal jurisdiction.16 6 This assertion
conflates the means and ends of establishing personal jurisdiction.
The Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland explained that the
requirement of personal jurisdiction "represents a restriction on
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty."16 7 Therefore, a party can waive a claim that
personal jurisdiction is lacking and a defendant can be estopped from
raising the issue.168 In short, the court's authority to determine
whether it has personal jurisdiction is grounded in the fact that the
requirement of personal jurisdiction reflects a concern for the
protection of individual liberty.
In contrast, the means of
determining whether personal jurisdiction exists when the
information sought is located abroad implicates foreign nations'
sovereignty. As discussed earlier, evidence gathering is part of the
trial and is conducted by the judge in civil law countries, and
therefore it is considered a judicial function.169
Before personal jurisdiction is established, the court's authority
to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists (because personal
jurisdiction is a matter of individual liberty) does not encompass the
authority to determine how discovery is conducted (because the
method of discovery is a matter of foreign sovereignty).
Consequently, at this stage courts should employ the Evidence
Convention.
The foreign nation consented to this procedural
mechanism, and therefore using it does not encroach upon its
sovereignty. Courts have not recognized the distinction between the
means and end of establishing personal jurisdiction, and how this
affects the court's authority to require parties to use the Federal
Rules for jurisdictional discovery. Nevertheless, exclusive application
of the Evidence Convention received support in Knight v. Ford Motor
Co. (albeit without extended justification) when the court stated:
"Only when [personal] jurisdiction is found does the analysis even

See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2000)
166.
("Since the Court has jurisdiction over these foreign defendants to the extent necessary
to determine whether or not they are subject to personal jurisdiction in this forum, the
Court sees no legal barrier to exercising the discretion given to trial courts by
Adrospatiale in cases of jurisdictional discovery."); In re Auto. Refinishing Paint
Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 303 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying the Adrospatiale balancing
approach to determine jurisdictional discovery).
167.
Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 (1982).
168.
Id. at 704.
169.
See supraPart II.B.
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begin as to whether the Convention should be invoked."1 70
Additionally, the Justice Blackmun in Adrospatiale noted that "[i]t is
well established that a court has the power to impose discovery under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when it has personal jurisdiction
over the party."171 This statement suggests that this power may not
exist when a court does not have personal jurisdiction over the party.
Although this approach has analytical appeal, if the procedures
of the Evidence Convention cannot produce the necessary
information, then the U.S. court has no way of knowing whether it
has personal jurisdiction over that party and therefore cannot
proceed with the litigation. But, a few considerations demonstrate
that this risk may not be as great as it initially appears. Justice
Blackmun, in Adrospatiale, explained that "[e]xperience with the
Convention suggests . . . [that] contracting parties have honored their

obligation to execute letters of request expeditiously and to use
compulsion if necessary."172 Additionally, the Hague Conference on
Private International Law recognized that Article 23 is a "continued
source of misunderstandings" 7 3 and it encouraged countries to
rethink their use of Article 23. Moreover, Justice Blackmun noted
that even when the reservations are in place, Article 23 only affects
letters of request for documents, and does not include the informal
procedures through a consul or a commission, or formal requests for
depositions or interrogatories.174
As noted earlier, the terms of the Evidence Convention allow
foreign governments, in responding to letters of request, to refuse to
produce the information when they have the privilege or duty to do so
under foreign law.175 Countries often invoke this privilege or duty in
areas like personal privacy, banking records, or information specific
to an industry. 176 Jurisdictional discovery only requires enough
information to establish minimum contacts between that party and
the U.S. jurisdiction.177 Therefore, because jurisdictional discovery
typically requires less information than merits discovery, the
information requested is less likely to be protected under foreign law
and consequently less likely to be undiscoverable through Evidence
Convention procedures.

Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 260 N.J. Super. 110, 119 n.11 (N.J. Super. Ct.
170.
Law Div. 1992).
Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S.
171.
522, 554 n.4 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 562.
172.
173.
Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, supra note 72, 1 29.
Adrospatiale,482 U.S. at 563 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
174.
175.
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 8, art. 11.
176.
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 13, at 914-15.
177.
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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B. The Evidence Convention as a FirstResort
If the possibility of an insurmountable roadblock to obtaining the
information necessary to determine personal jurisdiction is
unacceptable to a court, it could instead adopt a first-resort approach,
applying the Federal Rules only when the Evidence Convention
proves unsuccessful. Unlike the first approach, this one does not
assert that a court lacks authority to apply the Federal Rules.
Instead it asserts that (1) the holding in Adrospatiale does not apply
to jurisdictional discovery, and (2) the principle of comity supports a
first-resort approach.
The Court in Adrospatiale stated: "The question presented in this
case concerns the extent to which a federal district court must employ
the procedures set forth in the Convention when litigants seek
[discovery] . . . from a French adversary over whom the court has
7 8 The question presented, assuming personal
personaljurisdiction."1
jurisdiction over petitioners, frames the court's analysis and holding.
The court in In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation held that the issue of
jurisdictional discovery "was not resolved by the holding of
Adrospatiale."79 The Third Circuit is the only circuit to hold that
Adrospatiale applies to jurisdictional discovery.18 0 Courts outside of
the Third Circuit can assert that because the Adrospatiale decision
does not address jurisdictional discovery and the question presented
is premised on established personal jurisdiction, courts should not
extend the decision to cover jurisdictional discovery.
In Adrospatiale, the Court explained how resort to the Evidence
These
Convention would create unacceptable asymmetries.
asymmetries do not apply as forcefully to jurisdictional discovery.
First, the Court observed that it would allow the foreign party to
obtain discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules while the domestic
party would be required to use the Evidence Convention. 8 1 With
jurisdictional discovery, however, the domestic party filed suit and
consented to personal jurisdiction by the court. Therefore, the foreign
party is not conducting any discovery at this stage and not receiving
any advantages from the Federal Rules. Second, the Court explained
that the Evidence Convention gives an unfair advantage to foreign
corporations because they would be subject to less extensive discovery
even though they decided to market their products in the United
States. 182 As discussed above, in the case of jurisdictional discovery,

Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 524 (emphasis added).
178.
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2000).
179.
180.
See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 303 (3d
Cir. 2004) (holding that Adrospatiale applies to jurisdictional discovery).
Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 540 n.25.
181.
182.
Id.
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the foreign defendant is not receiving any advantages of the Federal
Rules because merits discovery has not commenced. Moreover, when
personal jurisdiction is contested, it has not been established that the
foreign defendant marketed its products in the United States and
consented to being hailed into U.S. courts.
Finally, the Court stated that because the Evidence Convention
applies only to parties from contracting states and not to parties that
are nationals of other, non-contracting states, "the [first resort] rule
would confer an unwarranted advantage on some domestic litigants
over others similarly situated."1 8 3 In the case of jurisdictional
discovery, this advantage is not as pronounced because the Evidence
Convention is only used to determine jurisdiction, rather than to
conduct merits discovery. More importantly, courts should not accept
the argument that applying the Evidence Convention is undesirable
because its procedures are only applied to some foreign litigants.184
Any instrument that is not universally agreed to will confer benefits
on some and not others, but this is a necessary, although perhaps
unfortunate, side effect to seeking cooperation among states through
transnational agreements and treaties. Given that the asymmetries
do not present intractable problems with respect to jurisdictional
discovery, they do not support an extension of the Adrospatiale
holding. Instead, they demonstrate that the decision was only meant
to apply to cases where personal jurisdiction has been established-as
noted in its question presented-and the parties are conducting
merits discovery.
The Court's reliance on the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law to guide the comity analysis further calls into question the
applicability of the Adrospatiale decision to jurisdictional discovery.
Section 442 of the Restatement begins in part (1)(a) with: "A court or
agency in the United States, when authorized by statute or rule of
court, may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce
documents, objects, or other information relevant to an action or
investigation." 8 5 Part (c) lists the factors courts use to decide
whether to order the production of information located abroad.18 6
The Restatement contemplates application of these factors when the
court has already established personal jurisdiction.
It is important to note that in setting out its three-part test (the
particular facts in each case, the sovereign interests implicated, and

Id.
183.
184.
See id. at 566 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to the
"unavoidable inequality inherent in the benefits conferred by any treaty that is less
than universally ratified").
185.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 442 (1987) (emphasis added).
186.
Id.
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the likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove effective18 7 ),
it is unclear to what extent the Adrospatiale decision relied on the
Restatement. But at the very least, the test and the Restatement are
closely connected. The first part of the Adrospatiale test, the
particular facts in each case, seems to encompass the Restatement's
factor one, the importance to the investigation or litigation of the
documents; factor two, the degree of specificity of the request; and
factor three, whether the information originated in the United States.
The second part of the Agrospatiale test, the sovereign interests,
resembles factor five, the extent to which noncompliance with the
request would undermine important interests of the United States.
The court in In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation recognized this
connection when it cited factor five of the Restatement in part two of
Factor four of the Restatement, the
the Arospatiale test.188
availability of alternative means of securing the information, relates
to factor three of the Adrospatiale test, the likelihood that resort to
the Evidence Convention procedures will prove effective. Although
factor four of the Restatement is likely referring to means outside of
court-ordered discovery, it relates to factor three of the Airospatiale
test because both reflect a concern for ensuring that the party can
obtain the necessary information. To the extent that the Court in
Adrospatiale relied on the Restatement to formulate its three-part
test, then this supports the argument that the Adrospatiale test
should not apply to jurisdictional discovery, because it relies on a
comity analysis that presumes that the court has personal
jurisdiction over the parties.
Taking into account that, (1) the question presented in
Adrospatiale explicitly notes the existence of personal jurisdiction; (2)
the unacceptable asymmetries do not apply as forcefully to
jurisdictional discovery; and (3) the Restatement's comity analysis is
premised on personal jurisdiction; courts (with the exception of those
in the Third Circuit, bound by In re Automotive Refinishing Paint
Antitrust Litigation) can forcefully argue that the Adrospatiale
balancing test should not be extended to jurisdictional discovery.
Instead, the principle of comity dictates that a first resort rule is
appropriate.
Justice Blackmun in Adrospatiale stated that "[there
is ... nothing inherent in the comity principle that requires case-bycase analysis."18 9 The Supreme Court, guided by the principle of
comity, has adopted general rules "in areas such as choice of forum,

187.

Adrospatiale,482 U.S. at 544.

188.
189.

In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2000).
Adrospatiale,482 U.S. at 554 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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maritime law, and sovereign immunity."190 He further recognized
that the comity principle guided the creation of the Evidence
Convention, and thus when parties can obtain the necessary
information pursuant to it, the court should not go through the
Justice Blackmun
comity considerations for a second time.191
explained that the conflicts usually mediated by comity "have been
eliminated by the agreements expressed in the treaty."1 92
Recognizing that the contracting states already considered the
principle of comity in drafting and signing the Evidence Convention,
courts should automatically defer to it.
Although the majority in Adrospatiale rejected this argument,
that decision did not encompass jurisdictional discovery, and the case
for first resort to the Evidence Convention is stronger for
jurisdictional discovery than for merits discovery. Given that the
foreign party may not have minimum contacts sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction by the U.S. court, courts should act with greater
deference to foreign interests. As one scholar noted,
Fundamental considerations of fairness and due process demand that
the court proceed with caution in imposing its rules upon a defendant
who might not have reasonably foreseen being brought before it.
Fairness considerations become even more central when the defendant
is a foreign party who owes no allegiance to the forum and is unfamiliar
193
with the mandates of the forum's legal system.

Courts have observed that jurisdictional discovery is usually
more limited than merits discovery.1 94 Therefore, they conclude that
the country's sovereign interests should be less offended by
application of the Federal Rules for narrower jurisdictional discovery
than they would be for merits discovery. However, the observation
that jurisdictional discovery is narrower could be used to argue that
the Evidence Convention should be applied more often for
jurisdictional discovery as compared to merits discovery. Because of
the limited scope of jurisdictional discovery, the procedures of the
Evidence Convention would be less onerous than for merits discovery.
A first-resort rule for jurisdictional discovery could familiarize
American judges and litigants with the Evidence Convention
procedures.
The unwillingness of courts to apply the Evidence
Convention in the first place deprives courts of meaningful

190.
Id. at 554-55.
191.
Id. at 556.
192.
Id.
193.
Iontcheva, supra note 165, at 888.
In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 303-04 (3d Cir.
194.
2004) ("There is also no reason to 'believe that the sovereign interests of... foreign
signatory nations would be any more offended by [the] narrower jurisdictional
discovery than they would be by the broader, merits-related discovery allowed by
Adrospatiale."'); see Fishel v. BASF Grp., 175 F.R.D. 525, 529 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (noting
that jurisdictional discovery is "not intrusive").
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information about how the Convention works in practice. If courts
invoked the Convention more frequently with jurisdictional discovery,
it may become more efficient and workable for all types of discovery.
Furthermore, the court in Fishel observed that "both sides want
an expeditious and reliable determination of those issues."19 5
Although the Federal Rules are generally considered more efficient
than the Evidence Convention,196 this is not sufficient to defeat a rule
of first resort. The claim that both sides want an expeditious
determination of whether the court has personal jurisdiction is
misleading. In a case where the court is determining whether to use
the Federal Rules or the Evidence Convention, it is probably because
the defendant requested that the court require discovery to proceed
through the Evidence Convention, a departure from the status quo.
The party requesting the Evidence Convention's procedures also
probably realizes that the Convention may be less efficient than the
Federal Rules. But, its request to use the Convention reflects
interests besides efficiency. Because the party is contesting personal
jurisdiction, it believes that a plausible argument can be made that it
does not have minimum contacts with the U.S. jurisdiction and,
therefore, should not be hailed into its court. It is probably for this
reason that the foreign party also wants to conduct jurisdictional
discovery pursuant to the Evidence Convention, rather than
procedural rules that it may not have foreseen being subject to.
Courts should recognize that the foreign party is more interested in
contesting jurisdiction through procedures that it is more familiar
with and do not offend that nation's sovereignty rather than
proceeding in the most efficient way possible. A rule of first resort
accommodates this concern by recognizing that when a court has not
conclusively established a relationship between the U.S. court and
the foreign party, respect for other nations' procedures should
outweigh judicial efficiency.
The court in Rich v. KIS stated that the Court's admonishment
in Adrospatiale for district courts to be sensitive to claims of abusive

Fishel, 175 F.R.D. at 529; see also Rich v. KIS Cal. Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 258
195.
(M.D.N.C. 1988) ("Another reason for using the Federal Rules instead of Convention
procedures concerns the immediate need for plaintiffs to have preliminary information
concerning the jurisdiction issue. Until jurisdiction is resolved, the lawsuit will
stagnate. This favors using the generally more efficient, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.").
196.
See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2000)
(invoking defendants' supposed interest in a quick resolution of the jurisdiction
question to justify proceeding with discovery under the Federal Rules); In re Bedford
Computer Corp., 114 B.R. 2, 6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990); Muse, supra note 6, at 1114
("While speedy and inexpensive disposition of litigation is obviously a valid and
important goal, continually placing convenience above comity, cooperation, and
Convention is a sad result indeed.").
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discovery provides enough protection to foreign litigants.19 7 But, as
evidenced by courts' treatment of jurisdictional discovery thus far,19 8
the Agrospatiale test in fact does not provide sufficient protection to
foreign litigants in cases of jurisdictional discovery. Foreign litigants
need more protection in cases of jurisdictional discovery because the
court has not established whether it has the power to adjudicate the
domestic party's claim.
A rule of first resort for jurisdictional discovery would elevate the
reputation of the United States as a cooperative player in
transnational litigation. It would also demonstrate that the United
States takes seriously the treaty commitments it has entered into.
One scholar hypothesized that,
[T]he antagonism incited by the extraterritorial application of U.S.
discovery rules might result in unwillingness by foreign countries to
compromise their values in other areas and hurt wider U.S. interests in
the international arena. It might also jeopardize valuable effortsoften spearheaded by the United States-to reach international
99
agreements on jurisdiction and procedure.1

The creation of blocking statutes and invocation of Article 23 are
evidence of the antagonism that U.S. court-ordered unilateral
discovery abroad has incited. 20 0 Another problem with the comity
analysis, as it is currently applied under Adrospatiale, is that the
individual facts of a case weigh heavily into the determination of
which procedural device to employ. As a result, the aggregate
benefits of applying the Evidence Convention more frequently in the
U.S. judicial system as a whole are neglected. As Justice Blackmun
in Adrospatiale pointed out, courts are used to examining the

Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 260.
197.
See In re Auto. Refinishing, 358 F.3d at 306 (Roth, J., concurring) ('Many
198.
times, rather than wade through the mire of a complex set of foreign statutes and case
law, judges marginalize the Convention as an unnecessary 'option."'); In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. at 54 (applying the Adrospatiale test and finding the
"Hague would be extremely unlikely to provide efficient and effective discovery");
Fishel, 175 F.R.D. at 529 (enforcing civil discovery rules and noting that the
Convention's "effectiveness in the present circumstances is directly in doubt"); In re
Bedford Computer Corp., 114 B.R. at 6 (utilizing the Federal Rules and stating "the
only effect of using the Hague Convention rules would be to further delay this
adversary proceeding"); Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 258 (finding the use of the "generally more
efficient" Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to be preferable to the Hague Evidence
Convention).
199.
Iontcheva, supra note 165, at 891.
200.
See Weis, supra note 2, at 930.
The enactment of blocking statutes in some of the signatory countries is
evidence of dissatisfaction with what they perceive as pervasive intrusions of
American discovery. The casual American approach to what some countries
regard as essential attributes of sovereignty does little to inspire confidence by
those countries in American courts.
Id.
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interests of the parties before them in individual cases. 20 1 When
foreign legal systems and interests are implicated, "[t]he presence of
these interests creates a tension between the broad discretion our
courts normally exercise in managing pretrial discovery and the
discretion usually allotted to the Executive in foreign matters."2 0 2
Because courts tend to focus on the parties before it, rather than the
potential aggregate benefits of applying the Evidence Convention for
U.S. foreign relations, a first-resort rule for jurisdictional discovery
would ensure that the broader interests of the United States are
accounted for.
A court can advance a rule of first resort by asserting that the
Adrospatiale test does not apply to jurisdictional discovery and that
the first-resort rule assures that due respect is paid to foreign nations
and parties at this stage of litigation where the U.S. court does not
know whether it has the authority to adjudicate a claim against a
foreign party.
It provides clear guidance to lower courts by
instructing them to look to the Evidence Convention and depart from
it only if they are unable to produce information necessary to
determine personal jurisdiction.
C. Applying the Evidence Convention as a Result of
the A6rospatiale Balancing Test
The final approach to invoking the Evidence Convention with
greater frequency is to apply the Adrospatiale balancing test, but
insist that the factors generally support application of the Evidence
This approach was taken in Jenco v. Martech
Convention.
International, and the court held that although the Federal Rules
may promote judicial economy, "the interests of protecting a foreign
litigant in light of the jurisdictional problems are paramount."20 3
Many of the same factors that a court could use to adopt a first-resort
approach above can be applied as part of the balancing test. Working
within the Adrospatiale framework, this approach invokes the
discretion given to trial courts and provides reasons for applying the
Evidence Convention. This approach fits the most comfortably with
existing case law. In applying the Adrospatiale balancing test, courts
should recognize the missteps of previous courts. As discussed above,
courts place too much emphasis on efficiency concerns and not
enough on fairness considerations at this stage of litigation.
Additionally, courts can take into account, in the comity analysis, the
201.
Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S.
522, 551 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202.
Id. at 551-52.
203.
Jenco v. Martech Int'l, Inc., No. 86-4229, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4727, at *2
(E.D. La. May 20, 1988).
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fact that the United States ratified the Evidence Convention, while
the other country did not consent to application of the Federal Rules.
Another error made by courts in the comity analysis is their
assertion that the foreign nation's sovereign interests would not be
offended by proceeding with discovery using the Federal Rules in
adjudicating the subject matter at issue (e.g., antitrust, products
liability, etc.). 20 4 This argument conflates the means and ends of a
dispute. The comity analysis determines whether the court should
use the Federal Rules or the Evidence Convention-what discovery
procedures the parties will use. Therefore, the comity analysis should
balance competing interests in procedures, rather than competing
interests in substantive law.
Where a plaintiff alleges that a defendant acted in a manner that
violates U.S. law, often the country where the defendant is from will
also have a general interest in preventing those same alleged actions.
Consequently, this argument almost always favors application of the
Federal Rules. The foreign nation's concern in the dispute between
the Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules is not about the
substantive legal issue, but about the means of adjudicating it, or in
the case of jurisdictional discovery, the means of determining
whether the U.S. court can even adjudicate the matter against the
Asserting that both countries have an interest in
defendant.
preventing some act by the defendant should not be used to inform
the decision of whether to use the Evidence Convention or Federal
Rules to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
The court in In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation recognized the
importance of respect for procedures in explaining that, "those
nations retain a separate and important sovereign interest in
ensuring that discovery involving their citizens be taken in accord
with their traditions and accepted practices. This interest of foreign
nations in the sanctity and respect of their laws is both important
and deserving of significant respect." 205 Courts should not focus on
the nation's interest in enforcing their substantive law; rather the
analysis should focus on the nation's interest in what procedures to
use to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

Cf. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 304 (3d.
204.
Cir. 2004).
As observed by the court in In re Vitamins there is no reason to assume that
discovery under the Federal Rules would inevitably offend Germany's sovereign
interest because presumably Germany, like the United States, would prohibit
the alleged price-fixing conspiracy and would welcome investigation of such
antitrust violation to the fullest extent.
Id. (citation omitted).
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d. 45, 53-54 (D.D.C. 2000).
205.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As Judge Roth stated in her concurrence in In re Automotive
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation, the Hague Convention has
been given "short shrift" since the Adrospatiale decision. 206 She
pointed to Judge Blackmun's opinion in Adrospatiale where he noted
that, "relatively few judges are experienced in the area [of
international law] and the procedures of foreign legal systems are
often poorly understood." 207 Plausible arguments can be made for
each of the three approaches for applying the Evidence Convention
more often to jurisdictional discovery disputes. In whatever way
courts do so, they should apply the Evidence Convention more
frequently to demonstrate their willingness to accord with
international obligations.
Kathleen Braun Gilchrist*

206.
In re Auto Refinishing, 358 F.3d at 306 (Roth, J., concurring).
207.
Id.
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Vanderbilt University Law School. Many thanks to the
members of the Executive Board for all their hard work, especially to Kelly Lineberger,
who has been a fantastic friend and coworker.

